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Abstract.
Recent changes in the structure and funding of UK media reflect a general trend in “developed” economies away from free-to-air broadcasting towards subscription funding, giving the viewer the ability to signal preferences through prices and thus hold suppliers to account by providing them with the sanction of “exit” (Hirschman 1970) – thereby mitigating one of the principal forms of broadcasting market failure. The growth of subscription-financed media has engendered a skeptical scrutiny of a number of established rationales for publicly-funded media, notably their efficiency, their accountability and the degree to which historically-established levels of intervention were proportionate to the extent to which broadcasting markets failed. In light of such developments, the author examines the case of the BBC, drawing on discussions prior to the most recent renewal of the BBC’s Charter (when its governance and accountability were major concerns). Drawing on the work of Hirschman, Marshall, Warnock and others, the author concludes that little has changed in the crucial relationship between the user and the broadcaster: not least because the viewer and listener’s relationship to the BBC is conceptually constructed as a passive rather than active relationship. 

Introduction.
Recent changes in the structure and funding of UK media reflect both a general trend in “developed” economies and (partial) realisation of the vision put forward in the 1986 UK Peacock Report on the financing of the BBC (Peacock 1986). The UK is experiencing a major, though unevenly experienced, redistribution of advertising revenues in “developed” economies. Ofcom’s most recent International Communications Market study tracked sharp rises in online advertising revenues between 2003-9 in thirteen countries (Ofcom 2010: 214) suggesting a widespread substitution of the Internet for “legacy” media (ie newspapers and broadcasting) as an advertising medium. In the UK, internet advertising spend grew by 10%, achieving a share of the UK advertising market of 24.3% (search advertising accounted for 56% of UK internet advertising), outpacing the overall recovery in the advertising market and thus signalling a loss of revenues by “legacy” media and a corresponding growth of internet advertising revenues, see http://www.iabuk.net/en/1/ukonlineadspendrises10percent051010.mxs (​http:​/​​/​www.iabuk.net​/​en​/​1​/​ukonlineadspendrises10percent051010.mxs​) . Newspapers experienced the biggest reduction in advertising revenues (more than 20%) whereas TV advertising revenues fell by 9% and radio advertising revenues fell by 15% (Ofcom 2010: 10). The OECD’s recent comparative study of news and the internet (OECD 2010) found such shifts to be representative of a decline in the newspaper sector in OECD countries - between 2007 and 2009 the newspaper sector in all OECD countries declined, ranging from a drop of 30% in the USA to 2% in Austria (OECD 2010: 18). The significance of this shift, particularly within the context of an overall fall in advertising spend, is that the funding model (advertising plus subscription/cover price) for media content production and distribution, notably news and current affairs, is in crisis. Advertising revenues, which once funded content production and distribution, including news, are now received by firms which do not produce content – Google, Yahoo, eBay and the like. 

In contrast to falls in advertising revenues broadcasting subscription revenues have experienced a rising trend– in the UK by 5.8% (Ofcom 2010: 9). This signals a widely generalised commercial media response to the changes in the advertising market – adoption of a different funding model: subscription finance or, where a mixed funding model has been used (eg by newspapers) to rebalance the elements of the funding model to prioritise subscription revenues​[1]​. Public policy responses have been mixed but in some countries there have been striking increases in public funding for content media. France has levied a turnover “tax” of 0.9%​[2]​ on ISPs and telcos to fund media content though funding remains largely favourable to broadcasting rather than the press: in 2010 3,620m euros of public finance was directed to broadcasting whereas only 578m euros went to press subsidies​[3]​ (Payette 2010: 24). In other jurisdictions the same bias is evident: in  Sweden, in 2008, 49.3m euros was devoted to press subsidies​[4]​ (Payette 2010:27) whereas 728m euros revenues accrued from broadcasting licences in 2004 (Anonymous 2005: 5) and so on. And in the UK, where there is no public funding support for the press​[5]​ public support for the BBC between 1997 and 2010 public grew by 63%.​[6]​ 

The UK Peacock Committee argued, in 1986, that technological change was making it possible for television viewers to express their preferences through the price system (subscription funding) and thus ensure that supply and demand in broadcasting – the most egregious of all failed media markets – would be more and more perfectly co-ordinated: markets would fail less. Peacock’s argument rested on two propositions, first that viewers and listeners are well able to identify their own needs and interests and thus should be sovereign and, second that, once created, well functioning broadcasting markets would enable viewers and listeners effectively to hold broadcasters to account through the price system which would express their preferences and the intensities of their preferences.​[7]​ 

Peacock’s arguments, and their adoption, exemplify what Moran (2003) identified as a general shift in modes of institutional governance and social co-ordination – away from hierarchical (“command and control”) governance towards market governance and co-ordination. Markets have been embraced both for their, putative, efficiency gains and also (as Peacock insisted) because they improve (putatively) users’ (consumers’) sovereignty and capacity to hold suppliers to account. 

The obvious problem is that this trend, towards greater responsiveness to demand, through subscription finance (market governance), though in theory well fitted to empowering users, in practice tends to undersupply the “merit goods” (eg news) on which free and democratic societies depend as well as, in practice, not emancipating users as much as theory suggests they might be. Subscription broadcasters tend to offer a bundle of services rather than individual services meaning that to get what they want consumers often have to purchase what they don’t want and also have to defray the higher transaction costs intrinsic to subscription finance. Dominant firms are able to exercise  market power in any or all areas of a complex supply chain (including content, encryption, electronic programme guides, subscription management, platform control) to chill and/or foreclose entry to broadcasting markets to the detriment of consumers (see, inter alia, Cox 2004: 50-53) and competitors. Nonetheless, subscription funding does empower users in ways that advertising and public funding do not – users can decide whether they wish to pay or not – they are not required to pay a compulsory subscription (a licence fee) or bear the costs of advertising whether or not they consume the media services funded, in whole or part, by advertising. 

It is not surprising therefore that the growth of subscription financed media, coupled with a recognition that media markets continue to fail (albeit in somewhat different ways) has engendered a renewed concern with the accountability of publicly funded media.​[8]​

The last major wave of testing public attitudes in the UK towards public funding of the media took place in the run up to BBC Charter renewal in 2006. Public consultation revealed what Jonathan Zeff, Head of Broadcasting Policy at the Department for Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS), referring to findings from DCMS’ 2005 public consultation on the terms of renewal of the BBC’s Royal Charter​[9]​), called “clear evidence of a general desire for greater accountability to viewers and listeners, for ensuring that the interests of licence-fee payers are properly represented, and for greater transparency in the way that the BBC operates.”​[10]​ Ubiqus, the company undertaking the consultation, summarised respondents’ concerns and stated: 

“The majority of respondents answering this question [ie about governance RC] wanted the Governors to be more directly accountable to and representative of the general public. This was the key recommendation from the public, and was often coupled to a reduction in Government influence and authority over the Governors and the BBC” (Ubiqus 2004: 33). 

Rather than increasing the salience of market governance, the then incumbent Labour government established a new body of hierarchical governance, the BBC Trust, to replace the BBC Board of Governors and made some significant changes in the “hows” and “to whoms” of BBC accountability. The conservatism of Labour’s model reflects the genuine difficulties of devising durable forms of public sector accountability – though they appear anomalous in relation to the same Government’s innovations in the accountability of public sector education, health and policing institutions.

The discussion which follows draws on Warnock’s (1974) notion of two part accountability (provision of information and ability to exercise sanctions) and on both Hirschman’s (1970) and Thompson’s (2003) triadic distinctions (respectively between exit, voice and loyalty and hierarchical, market and network forms of governance). I ask how are the accountability requirements of giving and account and holding to account exercised in the contexts defined by Hirschman and Thompson and focus on the role of trust (drawing on O’Neill 2002). I argue that the conservatism (and weakness) in the mechanisms and practices of BBC accountability arise from the prevailing normative conceptual framing of the relationships between the BBC and its viewers and listeners​[11]​. In contrast to the “strong” framing of the normative conception of the consumer (see Potter 1988) as an active user who can hold institutions to account in a well functioning market the citizen in broadcasting is constructed (following Marshall 1981) merely as the object of the distribution of welfare rather than as an active agent able to hold providers to account. These issues, though particularly sharply focused in the case of the BBC, are representative of more general issues which extend across other kinds of public funding of the media. 

The UK debate about BBC accountability has taken place in a context where, for the past two and a half decades, institutional co-ordination and governance through markets has greatly increased (liberalisation and privatisation) and hierarchical “command and control” governance has correspondingly diminished and in which much attention has been given to the accountability (substantial number) of public sector institutions which remain subject to hierarchical governance and organisation. 

Kelly and Muers (2002), in an influential paper for the Cabinet Office, referred to a wider trend towards “a more rounded accountability which faces outwards towards users and citizens, as much as upwards towards departments and inspectorates” (Kelly and Muers 2002: 35) pervading the UK (and more widely internationally, see inter alia Moore 1995) public sector: the police, health and education services have all experienced re-organisation to bring them closer, and make them more accountable, to their users​[12]​. The BBC is an exception to both these trends. Zeff’s testimony to dissatisfaction among BBC licence fee payers in 2005 reflected both a general issue in broadcasting policy and regulation in democratic and pluralist societies and the complexity, and sometimes obscurity, of established arrangements for holding the BBC to account in which three institutions play a major role – that is Government, Ofcom and the BBC’s own Governors. 

The Government controls the BBC’s public funding by setting the level, and duration, of the licence fee settlement. It determines the BBC’s remit by defining the terms under which the BBC operates, that is the Royal Charter and Agreement between the BBC and the Government (DNH 1996 and see also http://www.bbc.co.uk/info/policies/charter/ (​http:​/​​/​www.bbc.co.uk​/​info​/​policies​/​charter​/​​) on 19.6.2006). It appoints the members of the BBC Trust. In contrast to the important role played by Government in setting the terms on which the BBC operates, Parliament has few powers and responsibilities: it has the power only to accept or reject (but not amend) the Government’s proposals for the level and duration of the BBC licence fee (although it has become customary for the BBC to appear annually before the House of Commons Select Committee on Culture, Media and Sport’s hearing on the BBC’s Annual Report and Accounts).

The BBC is also subject to Ofcom, the UK’s statutory regulator for electronic media and communications, in respect of so called Tier 1 (harm and offence. fairness and privacy) and Tier 2 matters (notably programme production quotas) and (via provisions in the BBC’s Agreement with the Secretary of State) is also bound to adhere to the standards in Ofcom’s Broadcasting Code (at http://www.ofcom.org.uk/tv/ifi/codes/bcode/ (​http:​/​​/​www.ofcom.org.uk​/​tv​/​ifi​/​codes​/​bcode​/​​)  on 21.6.2006). Ofcom has the power to issue directions to, and to impose a fine of up to £250,000​[13]​ on, the BBC but has fewer powers over the BBC than it has over other broadcasters. The BBC Trust, which formally is the BBC, has sole responsibility for regulation of impartiality and accuracy (whereas Ofcom has this responsibility for all other UK broadcasters). Further, Ofcom and the BBC Trust have “overlapping jurisdiction” (see House of Lords 2011 passim) for several other matters including handling complaints about the BBC ​[14]​. 

The third element in the accountability arrangements which govern the BBC is the BBC Trust. The Trust is the BBC for legal purposes and is thus responsible for all aspects of BBC activity. But as well as its general responsibility for governance, including appointing and holding BBC management to account, the Governors are charged with specific regulatory responsibilities, (responsibilities which Ofcom discharges for all broadcasters other than the BBC) notably in respect of accuracy and impartiality. Among the chief perceived deficiencies of these arrangements are, first, the Governors’ dual roles of governance and regulation (can complainants, whether about accuracy or fair trading or other matters, be assured of fair treatment when the adjudicating body is the governing body? Can the Trust make independent judgements when it depends on the management for information and appoint the management?) and, second, the uncertain separation between BBC management and governance (which was thrown into relief by the Gilligan debacle on which Lord Hutton reported)​[15]​. 

The Trust was charged with improving the transparency of the BBC and with a duty to consult licence fee payers. It has built on the precedents set by its predecessor, the BBC Governors, and there can be no doubting the success of these bodies in improving the quality and quantity of data about the BBC that is now available in the public domain – not least through its Public Value Tests and issuing of Service Licences authorising BBC management to undertake specific activities on defined terms. Parliamentary attention, notably through select committees of both the House of Commons and House of Lords, that of the National Audit Office and the eliciting of information from the BBC under Freedom of Information entitlements have also done much to improve the extent to which the BBC gives an account of itself. However, viewers’ and listeners’ powers to hold the BBC to account, either directly or indirectly through their representatives in Parliament has hardly changed. 

But in spite of well established general trends towards market governance and accountability (Moran 2003) the governance and accountability of the BBC established by the new Charter and Agreement remains structurally similar to that which preceded it – funding and remit are handed down by Government and operational responsibility remains with the BBC management/executive. The Trust, like the Governors, has responsibility (with some duties remitted to Ofcom) for regulation and governance. 

Hierarchy or Market? Accountability through voice and exit. 
The substantial continuities in governance and regulation of the BBC reflect general problems in making public sector institutions effectively accountable to those whom they serve as well as issues specific to the BBC and the particular 2004-2006 Charter review conjuncture. Among the general problems are, as is well known, the inapplicability of price based purchaser/provider relationships, the remoteness of large scale institutions from users, the imperfect effectiveness of accountability through Parliament or other elected bodies. Moreover, there are further problems which arise from both the lack of direct contact between provider and user intrinsic to broadcasting and the need to safeguard the BBC’s journalistic and editorial independence. The latter consideration militates against control by Parliamentary (though some might judge this a lesser danger than that posed by the mechanisms of control – control of remit, finance and appointment of governing body- now vested in the Government) and/or by any new elected, broadcasting specific, body which might be subject to capture by an unrepresentative group or interest. 

What’s meant by the terms “accountability”, “hierarchical governance” and “market governance” which I have invoked? 

Mary, now Baroness, Warnock​[16]​ has argued that accountability consists in two elements - an entitlement to knowledge and a power to impose sanctions. She stated:

A is accountable to B where B has entrusted to A some duty (especially in regard to the spending of money) and where, if A fails to fulfil this duty, B has some sanction which he may use against A. This is one necessary part of it. But it follows that B has a right to be exactly informed of what A has done towards fulfilling his duty (Warnock 1974: 2).

Warnock’s model could be restated as a duty to give an account (provide information) and be held to account (be subject to sanction). Under the tutelage of the proposed BBC Trust, licence fee payers should be better informed, the BBC will be required to give a fuller account of itself to the public, but licence fee payers’ ability to exercise sanctions, to hold the BBC to account, will change little. One element of Warnock’s definition may be better satisfied, ie provision of information,  but powers of sanction will remain with the Government, Ofcom and the Trust (the successor to the Governors) rather than with the licence fee payer.

Broadly, accountability can be exercised either (or both) upward, that is to a superior authority, or downward, that is to those to whom an obligation is owed. For example, broadcasters are caught in both upward and downward relationships of accountability: they are upwardly accountable to their governing bodies (boards of directors for commercial broadcasters, directly or indirectly government appointed boards for public sector broadcasters) and to regulatory agencies (notably Ofcom) and they are downwardly accountable to viewers and listeners. 

As to the terms hierarchy and markets, governance, or control, of institutions may be exercised through a variety of different forms of co-ordination notably hierarchies (command and control), markets or networks (Thompson 2003) or a combination thereof. Accountability under hierarchical governance is generally upward whereas accountability in market governance is usually downward. Under network governance, accountability is customarily exercised through collaborative relationships and practices characterised by trust between the parties – one might call this horizontal accountability. 

It is a truism to observe that one of the “grand narratives” of UK public sector governance over the last quarter of a century has been a re-balancing towards market and away from hierarchical governance (see, for example, Moran 2003). This has been manifested both through a re-engineering of the internal relationships of public sector bodies to embody the precepts of “new public management” (NPM) on private sector lines (Osborne and Gaebler 1992) as well as through liberalisation and privatisation which reshaped public bodies’ outward facing relationships. The growing salience of market, rather than hierarchical, governance in the media and communications sector has been shaped both by technological change and by government policy. Government policy has shifted from inhibiting entry, by licencing of firms, to general authorisation and promotion of entry: in both broadcasting and telecommunications monopoly (or duopoly) has given way to competition between hundreds of firms. Technological change, has delivered falling prices and intensified competition between wired (fibre optic cables and digital compression) and wireless (satellites) transmission and in information storage and processing capacity and these, together with the general adoption of Internet Protocol standards, have made hierarchical control, whether of market entry or the content and character of services, more difficult to exercise. When firms enter markets which were formerly closed (due either or both to government policy or intrinsic capacity constraints – both factors applied to UK broadcasting) competition intensifies and with it (at least in theory) users’ power to use price to hold providers to account.

This is not to state that markets have completely displaced hierarchy, but rather that, the straightforward command and control systems of hierarchical governance which obtained 50 years ago for broadcasting, post and telecommunications, (that is all UK media and communications except the print sector), have given way to a complex intersection of different governance systems with market (and network) governance assuming a much greater role than before. In domains where, traditionally, hierarchical governance prevailed there has been a pronounced shift towards market governance and in some sectors, notably the Internet, a shift towards network governance and co-regulation​[17]​. In broadcasting the shift has been slower and less pronounced than in some other sectors but as advertising revenues decline and subscription funding grows both relative to each other and in absolute terms so the non-market elements in the UK broadcasting system, and the BBC in particular, have come increasingly to be measured against a market template.  

Market governance.
Although governance of media and communications over the last 25 years increasingly has been undertaken through markets (with accountability to users expressed through prices), market governance has notable deficiencies. Each of the two principal means of market funding of broadcasting, advertising and subscription, in varying degrees deny users the ability to express effectively their preferences through prices. Advertising financed programmes and services tend to respond to the interests of the advertisers who fund them rather than to viewers and listeners who consume them: advertising finance tends to engender clustering of programmes and services in a middle range (the “Hotelling” effect​[18]​) rather than matching offer and demand effectively (see, inter alia, Peacock 1986, Collins, Garnham and Locksley 1988). Subscription finance, though in theory well fitted to empowering users, in practice tends to operate through a bundling of services which are sold together rather than individually meaning that to get what they want consumers often have to purchase what they don’t want. Moreover, they also have to defray the higher transaction costs intrinsic to subscription finance. And both advertising and subscription funded services tend to super-serve the relatively wealthy and under-serve the relatively poor. Moreover, markets in general, and broadcasting markets are no exception, may be distorted by dominant firms exercising market power in any or all areas of a complex supply chain (including content, encryption, electronic programme guides, subscription management, platform control) to chill and/or foreclose entry to broadcasting markets to the detriment of consumers (see, inter alia, Cox 2004: 50-53). 

The Peacock Committee acknowledged (some) of these deficiencies in broadcasting markets and, though judging that the public, non-market, sector in broadcasting was probably disproportionately large recognised the desirability of a continued public service and public sector presence in UK broadcasting. Others, notably Andrew Graham (1999) and Gavyn Davies (2005), have elaborated what Graham has rightly called a “standard defence” of public service broadcasting and the BBC in particular. But these arguments, powerful and influential though they have been, did not give extensive consideration to the issues of the proportionality of intervention and of accountability which have increasingly figured in UK broadcasting policy debates.

Exit, Voice and Loyalty.
In 1970 Albert Hirschman published his Exit, Voice and Loyalty (Hirschman 1970) in which he identifies three ways in which stakeholders can hold institutions to account – through exercise of what he called “exit”, “voice” and “loyalty”. Different governance systems provide different means for stakeholders to signal their preferences by exiting from the relationship (eg by ceasing to buy products and services), making their voice heard (eg by voting) or by demonstrating their loyalty (doing nothing in circumstances where the alternatives of exit and/or voice are available). 

If “loyalty” is regarded as a null option (if one is loyal then one does not exercise voice or exit) “exit” is principally an option to be exercised through market systems of accountability and “voice” is principally an option to be exercised through hierarchical systems of accountability. Or put more pithily, exit is exercised through price and voice through politics. True, “voice” may be exercised in market systems (eg complaints) and “exit” may be exercised in hierarchical systems (eg leaving the jurisdiction in question) but “voice” remains a form of accountability principally exercised in political systems and “exit” a form of accountability principally exercised in market or commercial systems.

Applying Hirschman’s model to broadcasting shows that there are significant inadequacies in the prevailing accountability mechanisms of both market and hierarchical systems. In advertising financed, market, systems viewers and listeners have few opportunities to hold broadcasters to account and broadcasters are not characteristically required to give an account to users: users lack the means to effectively exercise the sanction of voice (though they may write, ‘phone in or formally complain) but they do have exit sanction powers. Although viewers and listeners do not directly fund advertising financed broadcasting, viewer and listener exit has adverse (indirect) financial consequences for the broadcaster. In subscription funded systems viewers and listeners also have few opportunities to hold broadcasters to account (and broadcasters are characteristically not required to give an account to users) through the exercise of voice (though they too may write, ‘phone in or formally complain) but they are effectively able to exercise the sanction of exit – and their exit has direct and adverse financial consequences for subscription financed broadcasters. 

For the BBC, funded neither by advertising nor subscription, viewers and listeners have few opportunities to either exercise voice or exit​[19]​. Viewers and listeners are unable either to directly and effectively represent their preferences to the BBC, ie exercise voice, because the BBC lacks the institutional forms of either joint stock companies (shareholders’ meetings, election of directors, reporting requirements defined by stock exchanges and financial regulators) or democratic politics (notably the election of representatives) through which “voice” can be expressed. But nor are viewers, licence fee payers,​[20]​ able to lawfully exit from their relationship with the BBC (other than by abstaining from all television consumption). Moreover, television receiving apparatus, possession of which triggers liability to pay the licence fee, includes not only conventional television receivers but also devices such as computers, mobile ‘phones and the like which are capable of receiving television signals. In Hirschman’s terms, the public is unable effectively to hold the BBC to account because it is unable to exercise either voice or exit. Public disenfranchisement appears increasingly anomalous as the very devices, such as computers and mobile ‘phones, which empower the public more effectively to control its general viewing experience trigger a liability to pay for BBC services,  whether or not they are used and independent of how much they are used, without a corresponding ability to hold the BBC to account. Loyalty, rather than being chosen, is made compulsory. The price of loyalty has also increased – as earlier stated, public funding of the BBC rose by 63% between 1997 and 2010. However, the BBC has been required to give an account of itself to viewers and listeners to a greater degree than have commercial broadcasters.​[21]​

The BBC and horizontal accountability.
In spite of the growth of market governance, the UK broadcasting sector is less subject to market governance, and thus accountability through exit, than are other communication sectors, such as the press, telecommunications or the Internet. In part this may be because of a sense of satisfaction (perhaps indeed nostalgia) for the stability (and achievements) of the old broadcasting regime (which came to an end in 1990 with the advent of subscription funded television) – what the Peacock Committee called the “comfortable duopoly” (Peacock 1986: para 197). And in part because of the success of Graham and Davies’ eloquent articulation of a “standard defence” of public service broadcasting: that is the argument that broadcasting markets fail pervasively and that a high level of intervention and hierarchical control is necessary to secure the public interest. The BBC, of course, had a major part in whatever successes the duopoly enjoyed and it also constitutes the main intervention made to redress failure in the UK broadcasting market. 

The BBC enjoys a very special status as a publicly owned body which in important respects is not subject either to external hierarchical governance and upward accountability or to market governance and downward responsibility to users. The importance of the BBC’s editorial and journalistic independence has secured significant measures of exemption for the BBC from the formal scrutiny of Parliament and from comprehensive regulation by Ofcom​[22]​: these exemptions qualify the extent to which the BBC is hierarchically subject to a requirement either to give an account of itself and to be held to account by an external authority. Moreover, the BBC, unlike all other media and communication enterprises, is not subject to market governance in respect of its funding. 

Viewers and listeners (formally, the licence fee is a charge only on television viewers but most radio listeners are also television viewers and thus licence fee payers) are unable lawfully to exit from their obligation to fund the BBC. Yet the BBC is not upwardly, hierarchically, accountable in respect of its funding as are other tax funded public sector and public service institutions are. The BBC’s licence fee/tax funding is not subject to Parliamentary scrutiny​[23]​, as is other tax funded activity, and only in 2011 was the BBC made formally subject to audit by the National Audit Office (NAO). The BBC’s self-regulating and self-authorising status has been thought necessary to secure the editorial and journalistic independence that is both a major raison d’etre of the BBC and is regarded widely as among its most significant and valuable achievements. The self-regulatory and self-authorising status of the BBC has rested on public trust in the BBC rather than on the ability of the public to hold the BBC to account through exercise of either exit or voice. How widely is the BBC trusted and how well founded is that trust? 

Trust.
Onora O’Neill (2002) has persuasively argued that trust based systems of governance have formidable advantages and that when trust is present formal accountability is not required. She also, cleverly, shows that formal systems of accountability are in the end based on trust because, in the end, all accountability chains have to end somewhere and there be anchored in a final trusted authority. Though the BBC remains among the best trusted of UK organisations it has neither been immune from the pervasive mistrust and suspicion which O’Neill has argued “have spread across all areas of life” (O’Neill 2002: 8) nor has it been innocent of actions which have been corrosive of trust. 

Mori research (Mori 2003: 12) found that television was second only to the army among trusted institutions in the UK (and radio followed fourth after the police). Although neither the radio nor the television about which Mori asked respondents maps perfectly onto the BBC it seems highly unlikely that were the BBC (with c 38% of television consumption and c53% of radio consumption) to be widely mistrusted Mori would have found such high levels of general trust in broadcasting. Further, YouGov found​[24]​, in a poll conducted in January 2005, that the BBC is “still the most trusted for news” (though Sky News is more trusted than the BBC’s News 24). Abundant testimony to the high levels of public trust in the BBC was also evident at the time of the Gilligan affair and the subsequent Hutton enquiry when public sentiment inclined towards the BBC rather than the Government.

Nonetheless, Lord Hutton’s probe (Hutton 2004) into the “Gilligan affair” revealed how some aspects of the BBC’s journalistic and editorial procedures had fallen short of the high standards on which public trust has been based​[25]​. Others have observed that in some respects the BBC’s procedures fall short of those adopted by other highly reputed news organisations – see, for example, BBC 2006). Further, O’Neill (2004) has observed that:

Reuters have taken various measures to back their ‘Independence and Trust’ principles​[26]​, which include freedom from bias…...   Their approach to self-regulation both prescribes standards and establishes certain structures and   disciplines to support adherence to those standards……. They   impose some routine disciplines on their financial journalists, by requiring them to declare shareholdings in companies on which they report to their   managers, and to refrain from dealing in those shares during the time in which they report.    Reuters’ journalists therefore face disciplines that those who work for the BBC…. do not face.   Journalists and editors working for ….. the BBC do not routinely have to declare their interests, or their conflicts of interest to their managers (let alone their audiences) or to withdraw from broadcasting on topics in which they have a financial interest”.

Different aspects of BBC conduct, such as those revealed in the PKF report on BBC funding (DCMS 2006a) and some of the NAO’s reports on value for money (see http://www.bbcgovernors.co.uk/docs/rev_valueformoney.html (​http:​/​​/​www.bbcgovernors.co.uk​/​docs​/​rev_valueformoney.html​)  on 20.6.2006) achieved by the BBC, have also given rise to concern and undermined public trust in the BBC. Further, specific enquiries into specific aspects of BBC journalism (such as BBC reporting of the European Union, the Israel/Palestine conflict and intra-UK affairs – see BBC 2005a, 2006 and 2008) also found grounds for criticism. Most damaging though has probably been Ofcom’s, the UK regulator of electronic communications, fining of the BBC £400,000 for eight separate breaches of the Ofcom programme codes. Ofcom commented “In each of these cases the BBC deceived its audience by faking winners of competitions and deliberately conducting competitions unfairly” (see http://www.ofcom.org.uk/media/news/2008/07/nr_20080730 (​http:​/​​/​www.ofcom.org.uk​/​media​/​news​/​2008​/​07​/​nr_20080730​) ). A year earlier, Ofcom had fined the BBC £50,000 for falsifying the results of a competition on the iconic children’s programme Blue Peter ​[27]​. Moreover, the sheer volume of recent studies and enquiries into the BBC suggest some generalised disquiet about aspects of its performance and grounds to probe whether the pervasive public trust in the BBC is wholly well founded​[28]​. As earlier noted, though the BBC is widely trusted, public consultation (see Ubiqus 2004 and 2005)  revealed public demand for improved accountability of the BBC and most of the official and expert enquiries undertaken in the course of Charter review (also noted above) recommended more effective scrutiny and more rigorous accountability. 

However, in spite of the force of the systems of accountability considered above, the BBC remains strikingly insulated from direct accountability to its users in respect both of the requirement fully to give an account of itself and to be held to account by them. In terms of giving an account, users depend for information on the width, depth and intensity of issue based independent scrutinies such as Charter review, on the BBC management’s annual report and accounts and on whatever research the Trust commissions and publishes. 

Club governance and (in)competent viewers and listeners.
We have then a complex series of (incomplete) systems of holding the BBC to account but which exist in a context of accumulating evidence that the BBC’s self-authorising practices in respect of providing value for money and unimpeachable journalistic and editorial quality may not be worthy of the high levels of public trust in the BBC. O’Neill’s proposition that “Traditional approaches to compliance relied heavily on cultures of trust” (O’Neill 2005: 1) does much to explain both why formal systems of holding the BBC to account have been patchy and underdeveloped and why there are now unprecedented levels of demand for more formality in the mechanisms used to hold the BBC to account. Ubiqus’ finding that “the majority of respondents…. Wanted the Governors to be more directly accountable to, and representative of, the general public” (Ubiqus 2004: 33) is eloquent (though little cited). The BBC’s governance reflects the survival of what Marquand (1988) and Moran (2003) have called “club governance”. 

“Club” governance is a system based on shared understandings, assumptions and trust between parties which Marquand described as follows: 

The atmosphere of British government was that of a club, whose members trusted each other to observe the spirit of the club rules; the notion that the principles underlying the rules should be clearly defined and publicly proclaimed was profoundly alien (Marquand: 1988: 178).

Club governance, which Moran contended was epitomised to the point of caricature by UK broadcasting, exemplifies the demerits of trust based systems. However, as O’Neill’s persuasive critique of accountability through target setting, quantification and the intrusive apparatus and perverse outcomes associated with what Power (1997) has dubbed the “audit society” testifies, alternatives to trust based accountability have notable demerits. These demerits may go far to explain the longevity of established, albeit creaky and complex, arrangements in respect of the BBC. 

But not all alternatives to trust necessarily share the demerits of the audit society, as O’Neill argued, “More intelligent systems for securing accountability could support rather than supersede the placing and refusal of trust” (O’Neill 2005: 13). Given O’Neill’s invocation of trust based accountability it is perhaps no coincidence that the Government has chosen to re-badge the BBC’s Board of Governors as the BBC Trust (even though the Government is at pains to make clear that the term “Trust” is not formally correct and that the BBC Trust is not a trust in any legal sense DCMS 2006: 48). 
Accountability or obligation?
The changes to the BBC’s governance have not strengthened, whether through voice or exit, the power of viewers and listeners to hold the BBC to account.  Rather, in varying degrees, they have remodelled the established system of upward, hierarchical, accountability. This contrasts with a general social trend (see Blaug, Horner and Lekhi 2006) towards greater user and citizen participation in the determination of policy and practice of public sector institutions.

Why should the BBC be an exception to this trend? Essentially because viewers and listeners are not though to be competent judges of their own needs and interests. In part this reflects a general relationship between professional experts and non-experts – it’s appropriate and customary for non-experts to defer to experts – in education, medicine, law and other domains. In part it reflects the BBC’s sedulous guardianship of its independence, recently exemplified in its rejection (on the grounds that the electoral process might be subject to capture) of election of members of its advisory committees.​[29]​ In part it’s a legacy of Reith’s notion of users of BBC services as incompetent to judge their own needs.​[30]​ A notion which the Pilkington Committee eloquently re-stated as “Those who say they give the public what it wants begin by underestimating public taste and in the end by debauching it” (Pilkington 1962: para 47). And in part an aspect of the BBC’s role as provider of “merit goods”​[31]​: individuals are likely to “under demand” merit goods, goods and services beneficial to society as a whole, when greater benefits accrue to society than accrue to the individuals making the demand decisions. In such cases supply will reflect the lower levels of demand expressed by individuals acting in their individual interests rather than the levels optimal for society as a whole. In consequence, society should step in to collectively supplement the inadequate levels of individual demand (see, inter alia Graham’s [1999] “standard defence” of public service broadcasting and his argument for its role as a provider of merit goods). 

A view of individual users of broadcasting services as incompetent to decide leads necessarily to a rejection of viewer and listener sovereignty over the BBC (and, in stronger versions of the argument, over broadcasting). But such a conception of the viewer and listener risks leaving the BBC marooned as an isolated relic of “club governance” and under-developed downward accountability at a time when both other public sector bodies (see, inter alia the Public and Patient Involvement forums established by all NHS Trusts and the Home Office’s requirement that the police engage and involve communities in crime reduction and priority setting. [See Department of Health 2003 and Home Office 2004]) are strengthening their accountability to users and when consumer sovereignty is more and more salient as an objective in markets. 

Pattie, Seyd and Whitely, in an extensive study of contemporary citizenship in the UK, argue that identification of the concept of citizenship with the ability to have a say in decisions is of long standing and characterise Aristotle’s normative conceptions of citizenship and society as ones in which “Participation legitimates decision-making which is a key requirement of active citizenship” (Pattie, Seyd and Whiteley 2004: 6). They considered what they call the “opportunity structures” (Pattie, Seyd and Whiteley 2004: 115) available in the UK for participation in decision making beyond formal high politics and found significant differences in these “opportunity structures” in different sectors (relatively well developed in education, less well developed in health and so on. Broadcasting was not considered​[32]​ but even in the health area where the opportunity structures were, at the time of  Pattie, Seyd and Whiteley’s study, under-developed 50% of respondents stated that they had influenced the way in which they were treated (see Pattie, Seyd and Whiteley 2004: 120).

The consumer and the citizen in broadcasting. 
The growth in salience of the market sector in communications (and the impact of New Public Management and privatisation on the public sector in general) has led some to defend doggedly the BBC as a public sector bastion. This defence has characteristically been made in terms of the values and objectives signified by the term “citizenship” which has in turn been categorically distinguished from the term “consumer”.​[33]​ In consequence the user of broadcasting services has come to be conceived dualistically as both a citizen and as a consumer (or as a hybrid citizen/consumer) with different accountability relationships attaching to each identity. 

Accountability to consumers, normatively, is to be realised by enabling consumers to make (or not make) purchases from one or more of a number of competing providers. Within this sort of normative schema public service broadcasting, and the BBC in particular, looks at best somewhat odd and at worst appears as a major obstacle standing in the way of a well functioning market through which consumers are able to hold producers and providers accountable through the price system. Accountability to citizens, on the other hand, is both more difficult to define (but see Calabrese and Burgelman 2003, Hartley 1999, Murdock 1999, 1999a, 2004, Stevenson 2003) and to realise. Moreover, the term “citizen” has been given a particular inflection in discussions of UK broadcasting policy and this inflection has marginalised accountability questions. The notion of citizenship as a power to share in decision making (see inter alia Brinckmann 1930) or, in Hirschman’s terms to exercise voice, has scarcely been considered, still less implemented. Perhaps the fear of what Heller (1978: 2) wittily identified as the unwelcome possibility of a “Hobbesian state of anarchy and disruption” which might attend the exercise of a “public right to intervene in the management of services” is the reason for this absence. Fear of Hobbesian horror, rather than fear of “public service bureaucracies that are insulated from public or parliamentary scrutiny and effectively independent in their pursuit of organisational objectives and growth” (Heller 1978: 2) has been stronger in informing public policy and practice. 

Instead of either a market system of accountability, in which users can exercise the sanction of exit, or a hierarchical system, in which users can exercise the sanction of voice, the BBC is governed by a kind of trust based horizontal system of network accountability based on mutual obligation. These reciprocal obligations consist in the broadcaster’s obligation to provide the information and education (sweetened with entertainment) which viewers and listeners require to participate fully in social and political life and in viewers’ and listeners’ obligation to provide the funding necessary for broadcasters to do so. If trust, on which such relationships of mutual obligation depend, erodes (as trust in the BBC has begun to erode) and if more formalised and effective accountability arrangements of voice and/or exit are established in other domains (as they are being and have been) then the institutions and relationships of a trust based order tend to lose legitimacy. 

This, I believe, is what is happening in respect of the BBC. The decline in trust and thus legitimacy is rooted in a major internal cause, notably, the decline in BBC performance, and in a major external cause, the growth of more effective voice and exit based systems of accountability in relevant comparable institutions. Neither the new arrangements implemented following renewal and revision of the BBC Charter and Agreement and nor the conceptual framing of scholarly discussion of the BBC’s socio-political role and the appropriate accountability relationships between it and its users and funders seem adequate to meet these challenges.

Consumer and Citizen.
The shift towards market, and away from hierarchical, governance in broadcasting has led to what Murdock called “the figure of the consumer and the ideology of consumerism” (Murdock 1999:10) rising in salience. Consumerism, Murdock proposes (and here he’s representative of scholarly reflections on citizenship and broadcasting), is hostile to citizenship and the values implied in the category “citizen”: consumerism “privileges personal spending over social and political participation, and addresses viewers as shoppers rather than as members of intersecting moral communities” and “by equating social differences with variations in choice and style it negates any attempt to arrive at a conception of the ‘common good’ based on the negotiation of differences in their full complexity” (Murdock 1999: 10). This view, though representative, acknowledges insufficiently the concern for liberty rather than self-interested consumption, which has informed the major UK arguments for consumer sovereignty in broadcasting (see, for example, Brittan 1987, Coase 1950, 1966, Peacock 1986). Further, it masks the complementarities between “citizenship” and “consumer” values in the arguments advanced by proponents of the consumer interest (see, for example, NCC 1993, Potter 1988, and Sargant 1992, 1993). Moreover the version of citizenship characteristically mobilised in the UK broadcasting discourse puts forward an amputated notion of citizenship – because insufficiently acknowledging a normative capacity to share decisions – a notion strongly indebted to the work of T H Marshall. 

Citizenship.
There are a host of definitions of “citizenship”, but Brinkmann’s (1930: 471) usefully identifies two components to citizenship, notably: “the notion of liberty… and membership of a political unit involving co-operation in public decisions as a right and sharing of public burdens…. as a duty”. Interestingly, neither of these normative conceptions has much figured in UK accounts of broadcasting and citizenship and this may be explained by the remarkable salience of the work of T H Marshall in such discussions. Marshall is the most cited author​[34]​ in the index to Calabrese and Burgelman’s collection of essays on citizenship and communications and Marshall’s thought is the source of the “welfarist” move characteristically evident in contemporary scholarly discussion of broadcasting and citizenship. Marshall’s influence, of course, extends far beyond media studies: he was, for example, head of the Social Science Division of UNESCO in the late 1950s. The welfarist move, I argue, constitutes broadcasting as one of a bundle of welfare rights​[35]​and thereby extends Marshall’s triad of rights (civic, political and social) to encompass additional putative broadcasting related rights.

Calabrese usefully summarises Marshall (Calabrese and Burgelman 1999: 261) as having defined citizenship as consisting in three elements, each realised at a distinct historical moment: first, civic rights (secured in Western Europe in the C18th); second, political rights (secured in Western Europe at the end of the C19th) and, third, welfare rights (secured in Western Europe in the C20th​[36]​). 

Marshall’s triadic bundle of rights (civil, political and social) provides a template for a number of influential accounts of citizenship and the media. Murdock (1999a: 29-30), for example, extends Marshall’s bundle to include a further putative type of right – information and cultural rights and has argued that “the core rationale for public service broadcasting lies in its commitment to providing the cultural resources required for full citizenship” (Murdock 2004: 2). Hartley (1999: 179) further extends the definition of citizenship to include not only this fourth form of citizenship, cultural citizenship, but a fifth: DIY – Do it Yourself – citizenship. Moreover, Murdock’s (1999a) coupling of information and cultural rights/attributes of citizenship can be separated (as Murdock does by considering separately information and cultural rights. Indeed, Murdock further distinguishes between two types of information and two types of cultural right) to yield a five layered model of citizenship like Hartley’s​[37]​.
 
Marshall and his successors thus offer a notion of citizenship as onion: each bundle of citizenship entitlements/attributes surrounds the others concentrically and in complementary and non-rival fashion. But all layers of the onion must putatively be present if the entitlements of citizenship are to be fully realised – Marshall added a third layer – social rights - to a pre-existing two layer onion  - civic and political rights – and Murdock, Hartley and others have added further layers (notably the cultural and/or informational and the DIY layers).

Marshall’s extension of the concept of citizenship constructs citizenship passively, as a series of entitlements – or as he puts it “rights and legitimate expectations”, rather than as an active, participatory and creative practice​[38]​. Marshall refers to “”welfare” as an “integral part of the whole apparatus that includes social security, education, public health, the medical services, factory legislation, the right to strike, and all the other rights and legitimate expectations which are attached to modern citizenship” (Marshall 1981a: 81). Citizenship is thus a condition of competence legitimately to make claims on others within a polity. It does not include the power to hold authority to account or to participate in making decisions. Ernest Gellner (1980) accurately spiked this unfortunate characteristic of Marshallism when describing the inheritors of Marshall’s crown in the Department of Social Administration at the LSE as advocating a “Distressed Affluent Folk’s Aid Society” which practiced a “kind of embourgeoisement of noblesse oblige” (Gellner 1980: 13).

Although the connection between academic discourse and the discourse and practice of public policy is uncertain and often fugitive yet there is a striking similarity in usage and sentiment between UK academic and policy discourses in this matter.

Consumer and Citizen concepts in action.
The terms, consumer and citizen, was embedded in UK broadcasting law for the first time in the Communications Act 2003 (CA 2003) which requires Ofcom​[39]​ to further the interests of citizens and consumers. The CA 2003 defines “citizen” as “all members of the public in the United Kingdom” (1.3.14) but does not define “consumer” (though the Act attributes particular importance to consumers’ interests, notably “in respect of choice, price, quality of service and value for money” (1.3.5)).  The Act requires Ofcom:

(a)	to further the interests of citizens in relation to communications matters; and
(b)	to further the interests of consumers in relevant markets, where appropriate by promoting competition. (CA 2003 3.1).

In spite of the Act’s mention of citizens before consumers Ofcom has, in practice, leaned more towards its duty to consumers. In doing so it follows one of its predecessors, Oftel, which was charged in the Telecommunications Act 1984 to “promote the interests of consumers, purchasers and other users” (TA 1984 I.2.a). In contrast, duties towards the citizen were neither defined in the Telecommunications Act 1984 nor in the Broadcasting Acts 1990 and 1996 (the chief relevant UK legislation on electronic communications prior to the CA 2003).

The term “consumer”, though found in the Telecommunications Act 1984, effectively entered the UK broadcasting policy discourse in the Peacock Report (Peacock 1986). The Report, formally a consideration of BBC funding, argued for stronger and more effective consumer sovereignty realised through a greater use of markets. Peacock argued that technological change permitted implementation of a subscription television market making broadcasting more responsive to demand and thereby enhancing consumer sovereignty. 

Broadcasting markets have changed in different ways to those Peacock envisaged, and UK pay television is far from a consumer arcadia, but though the Peacock Report’s predictions have yet to be borne out it marked a decisive conceptual break with established doctrines which constituted viewers (and listeners) as vulnerable and in need of protection​[40]​. 

Opposition to the Peacockian vision (and notably to the reduction in the size and scale of public service broadcasting which Peacock foreshadowed) and its flagship notion of the sovereign consumer crystallised around the rival, and somewhat numinous, term “citizen” (see, inter alia, Calabrese and Burgelman 1999). This term, though never articulated in a formal and official report as had been the term consumer was in the Peacock Report, was inserted into the CA 2003 as one of the two fundamental interests which Ofcom was charged to serve. The term citizen entered the text of the Act thanks to successful lobbying of Parliament by broadcasting activists concerned by the possible effect on broadcasting of a duty on Ofcom to secure only the consumer interest. 

Since the CA 2003 came into effect the BBC, the Government and Ofcom have all put forward accounts of broadcasting and citizenship. The Government’s White Paper on the future of the BBC “A public service for all: the BBC in the digital age” (DCMS 2006) fills out notion of citizenship first put forward in the CA 2003. It identifies “sustaining citizenship and civil society” as the first of the six public purposes with which the BBC is charged. The remaining five purposes are:
	Promoting education and learning; 
	Stimulating creativity and cultural excellence by using the licence fee as venture capital for creativity; 
	Representing the UK, its nations and regions; 
	Bringing the UK to the world and the world to the UK; 
	Building digital Britain. 

The White Paper further elaborated the BBC’s citizenship mandate (DCMS 2006: 13) as a duty to:

	Inform the public and increase understanding of the world through news, information and analysis of current events and ideas; 
	Set standards of quality in news and current affairs; 
	Engage the widest possible cross-section of the UK population with differently-targeted services, including BBC Online; 
	Continued commitment to local and regional news; 
	Stimulate engagement with social and political issues through programming outside news and current affairs – e.g. through themed seasons or campaigns; 
	Help people understand Parliament and the UK political system including the devolved administrations; BBC Parliament should continue to carry dedicated coverage of Parliamentary matters, and there should be regular coverage of Parliament in both news and other programming on mainstream channels; 
	Contribute to democratic debate in forms other than broadcast content – for example by organising seminars and e-discussion forums, distributing information and working on campaigns with partners in the public and voluntary sector – within clear boundaries; 
	Implement the core recommendations of the Neil report​[41]​. 

The BBC itself has defined its own contribution to citizenship in terms similar to those which the Government put forward in the White Paper, it stated:
“The BBC’s contribution to informed citizenship refers to those of the BBC’s activities that are designed to help equip the public with the knowledge and capability necessary to act as informed citizens through:

	Providing accurate, impartial and balanced coverage of news and current affairs in order to help the public make informed choices
	Reporting the proceedings of the political process in the UK and internationally
	Stimulating the public debate on a range of social, political and other current affairs issues” (BBC 2004a: 2).

In contrast, Ofcom put forward a more broadly defined notion of citizenship than has either the Government or the BBC. In 2004 Ofcom initiated a process of public engagement and reflection on the meaning of “citizen” and “consumer” in the context of broadcasting policy. Ed Richards, Ofcom’s Senior Partner for Strategy & Market Developments (on 25/5/2004 to the Westminster Media Forum) described broadcasting’s citizenship mandate as (all citations from Ofcom 2004):

“We argue that there are four core purposes of PSB that reflect the potential of broadcasting (not just television) to benefit society more generally, beyond our interests as private consumers. 
	To inform ourselves and others and to increase our understanding of the world through news, information and analysis of current events and ideas 
	To reflect and strengthen our cultural identity through high quality UK, national and regional programming 
	To stimulate our interest in and knowledge of the world, including the arts, science, history through content that is accessible, encourages personal development and promotes participation in society 
	To support a tolerant and inclusive society through the availability of programmes which reflect the lives of different people and communities within the UK, encourage a better understanding of different cultures and perspectives and, on occasion, bring the nation together for shared experiences”. 
Richards argued that, though commercial broadcasting contributed to the achievement of citizenship goals, public service broadcasting was necessary if these goals were to be achieved. 
“it is clear that the market can and does provide programmes that meet these core purposes - Sky News, channels such as Arts World and the History Channel are just some examples. So we are not saying that the market will not deliver, rather that it will not deliver enough. That even in a digital world, there will be under provision of programming that meets these purposes”.
Broadcasting’s citizenship vocation, whether defined relatively tightly (eg by the Government and BBC as the provision of news and information services so that users can understand and engage in formal politics) or more broadly (eg by Ofcom to include a cultural and social dimension) is agreed to be the provision of information to viewers and listeners. 

In contrast, when broadcasting’s relationship to viewers and listeners as consumers is under discussion, the idea of “control” is of considerable importance. Richards stated that: 
“As consumers, our concern is that we are supplied with what we as individuals, or perhaps on behalf of our families, want to watch or what we want to have an option to watch”
And he further proposed, (as the Peacock Committee in 1986 had envisaged), that: 
“post analogue switch off we will see the evolution of something approaching a reasonably well functioning market in broadcasting……. consumers, through their own choices will be able to express their preferences - through what they choose to watch, what they choose to subscribe to or what they choose to buy on a per view basis”.

In these representative statements by the principal policy actors, Government, broadcaster and regulator, we see broadcasting’s role in respect of the citizen defined (whether broadly or narrowly) as the provision of socially desirable content by broadcasters. Whereas the relationship between broadcasting and the consumer is conceived normatively as one in which consumers are able to express and realise their preferences. The rhetorical construction of the broadcasting citizen and the broadcasting consumer is that being a citizen is to have provided by an authority: control resides outside the citizen. Whereas, being a broadcasting consumer is to be in control of what one watches (or listens to): control resides with the consumer.

Conclusion.

The debate about the future of the BBC which took place in the UK throughout 2004-2006 was remarkable for its range and intensity although finally resulting in something very like the status quo ante for the BBC. The accountability of the BBC, although a matter on which both the public expressed its concern in the Government’s consultations and Parliamentary and other enquiries expressed views in the wealth of commentaries and reports which appeared during Charter review, remains much as it was before. True the Trust is charged to give viewers and listeners a better and fuller account of the BBC than was, and did, the Governors. True, the Trust is more clearly distinguished from the BBC management than was its predecessor and may therefore be better able to hold the BBC to account. But little has changed in the crucial relationship between the user and the broadcaster. Whether as consumer or citizen the viewer and listener disposes of few powers to hold the BBC to account. 

This is because, first, the viewer and listener’s relationship to the BBC, in respect of formal accountability, is conceptually constructed as a relationship of citizenship (rather than of consumption)  and because, second, there is a clear normative rhetoric in both scholarly and policy domains which constructs broadcasting citizenship as a derivative of the content which broadcaster(s) provide for viewers and listeners: content the consumption of which, it’s assumed, will foster citizenship properties in viewers and listeners.​[42]​ This then is a passive conception of citizenship. Whereas the consumer of broadcasting is, normatively at least, able to exercise choice – s/he is constructed as an active agent. In consequence the viewer and listener is compelled to trust, s/he has neither voice nor exit and thus enjoys no alternative to loyalty. For s/he has, at best, only an account of the BBC given by an unchosen representative, the Trust, rather than the ability to hold to account which, normatively, a non-ian citizen might enjoy.
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^1	  Usually also accompanied by significant cost reductions. In the UK, for example, the Financial Times doubled its cover price from £1 daily in mid 2007 to £2 from 2009 and reduced pagination.
^2	  However, this initiative is currently a matter of dispute and has been escalated to a European Union level.
^3	  France has levied 0.9% on the turnover of telcos and ISPs for a content fund, though this funding is currently subject to appeal. One estimate suggests that 12% of French newspaper revenues accrue from subsidies estimated at 1bn euros annually (see http://www.eubusiness.com/news-eu/france-media-press.62b ). 
^4	  Albeit declining year by year (see Picard nd).
^5	  Exemption from VAT excepted. 
^6	  In the period between 1997, when a Labour government took office, and 2010,when it lost office, the BBC’s income rose by 63% (because of greater efficiencies in licence fee collection and growth in numbers of households as well as increases in revenues accruing from rising licence fees. My estimate is based on data from the BBC’s Annual Report and Accounts for 2009 and on data extracted by Wikipedia from BBC Annual Report and Accounts for 1998 (see http://downloads.bbc.co.uk/annualreport/pdf/bbc_ar_online_2009_10.pdf and http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Television_licensing_in_the_United_Kingdom_(historical) both accessed on 19.10.2010). These rises came at a time when  national finances deteriorated: in 2009, for example, UK GDP fell by 4.9% and GDP per head fell by 5.5% (see ONS 2010: 20 and 22). Some of the BBC’s “Jacuzzi of cash” as the BBC’s Director General, Mark Thompson (in 2002 when Chief Executive of Channel 4) described it was “topsliced” (although that term is strongly resisted by the BBC) to fund digital television switchover and the incoming Conservative government gave the BBC further “topsliced” responsibilities – notably for funding the Welsh language television service S4C and the BBC’s external services.
^7	  The Peacock Committee’s argument looked forward to the advent of subscription television but radio posed different problems. The Committee proposed that radio should be financed by a licence fee for car radios (and advertising). However the licence fee method would scarcely advance consumer sovereignty and accountability.
^8	  This is not to understate rising concern about media accountability in general, in the UK the revelation that employees of a major media group, News International, had routinely broken into private communications sparked intense concern and widespread demands, from public and elite opinion, that offending managers be more effectively held to account. 
^9	  See several relevant documents including an analysis of consultation responses at http://www.bbccharterreview.org.uk/publications/cr_pubs/pub_gp_summaryresponses.html  on 12.4.2006.
^10	  At The Future of the BBC: Westminster Media Forum Consultation Seminar on the Green Paper.  June 2005.
^11	  This hybrid term should be understood to include all users, including online, of BBC services.
^12	  For example, Patient and Public Involvement Forums (PPI) have been established for all NHS Trusts. Statutory bodies made up of local volunteers and representatives of voluntary organisations (see Department of Health briefing note at http://www.dh.gov.uk/assetRoot/04/07/42/88/04074288.pdf  on 14.8.2006). Trusts must provide information to PPIs on demand and a PPI Forum has a statutory right to enter and inspect premises where either NHS Trusts or Primary Care Trusts provide services. In another relevant domain, Neighbourhood Policing policies charge the police with the duty to engage and involve communities in crime reduction and priority setting and to work with citizens more closely (see Home Office 2004).
^13	  Fines may be cumulative – for example, in 2008 Ofcom fined the BBC £400,000 in respect of eight instances of misleading audiences. 
^14	  The BBC is also subject to Ofcom (which is the lead competition regulator for the communications sector) in respect of the Competition Act 1998 and Enterprise Act 2002. However, some aspects of the BBC’s status as a public service and public sector body also mean that some provisions of the Competition Act 1998 and Enterprise Act 2002 are of uncertain application to the BBC (see Cave, Collins and Crowther 2004).
^15	  In 2003, a senior judge, Lord Hutton, was appointed to inquire into the death of a British civil servant, Dr David Kelly. His report, (which constitutes the chief public official judgement on the UK’s 2002 invasion of Iraq and also on the BBC’s news report of 29th May 2003 which asserted that that the Government had “sexed up” the threat posed by Iraq’s supposed weapons of mass destruction), found, inter alia that “the editorial system which the BBC permitted was defective” (Hutton 2004: 322) and that the BBC management were “at fault” (Hutton 2004: 200). Hutton’s findings prompted the resignation of both the BBC’s Director General and the Chairman of the BBC Governors. The Governors had quickly defended BBC management in the face of Government criticism and their action gave rise to concern that Governors and management may not have been sufficiently separate. This problem has been mitigated by the relocation of the Governors to BBC premises separate from those of the management and by a significant expansion of the Governors’ Secretariat. 
^16	  Warnock is a member of the House of Lords, a philosopher of established reputation and served as a Member of the Independent Broadcasting Authority.
^17	  Co-regulation is also growing in broadcasting, for example Ofcom has “outsourced” regulation of television advertising to the private sector self-regulatory body the Broadcast Committee of Advertising Practice (BCAP).
^18	  See Hotelling 1929.
^19	  True, viewers and listeners may cease to consume BBC programmes but this has no obvious financial impact on the BBC (BBC funding has risen over the last decade although its share of television, but not radio, consumption has fallen). However, it seems likely that there is a “tipping point” at which compulsory licence fee funding would cease to have legitimacy because too few watched or listened to BBC services. That point has yet to be reached.
^20	  The licence fee is a charge only on television viewers – currently there is no radio licence in the UK. The licence fee is formally classified as a tax by the Office of National Statistics (ONS 2006).
^21	  Although the BBC is, and under the Trust will increasingly be, subject to the duty to give an account of itself. Moreover during Charter review the BBC was required to give extensive account of its practices. 
^22	  Though at the price of significant measures of Government control of BBC finance, remit and governance. 
^23	  Parliament can only approve or reject, but not amend, the Government’s proposals for the BBC licence fee.
^24	  YouGov press release at http://www.yougov.com/archives/pdf/OMI050101003_2.pdf  on 27.2.2006. See also (BBC 2004a: 45).
^25	  The BBC’s own reflections on its journalistic and editorial practices, the Neil Report, (BBC 2004b) constructively acknowledged that the BBC had a case to answer and that its procedures and training should be improved (the BBC has adopted the Neil Report and begun to implement its recommendations). 
^26	  See the Reuters ‘Independence and Trust’ Principles. “Reuters shall at no time pass into the hands of any one interest, group or faction”;  “the integrity, independence and freedom from bias of Reuters shall at all times be fully preserved” and “Reuters shall supply unbiased and reliable news” See http://about.reuters.com/aboutus/editorial/independence.asp  on 16.2.2006.
^27	  The BBC Trust stated that these “were particularly serious as they resulted in children being misled to participate in a competition they had no chance of winning and in a child in the studio being involved in deceiving the audience”. See http://www.bbc.co.uk/bbctrust/news/press_releases/2007/ofcom_blue_peter.html 
^28	  To invoke the findings of National Audit Office studies of the BBC’s operational performance and the findings of enquiries into the quality and character of BBC journalism may suggest that the BBC is damned if it does and damned if it doesn’t. There can be no doubt that the commissioning, formally by the Governors, and publication of such studies betokens a laudable transparency in BBC governance and perhaps a healthy institutional culture of self-criticism. 
^29	  All the BBC’s (and BBC appointed) advisory bodies have refused to brook election of their members (BBC 2005: 94, 97, 100, 103). And the BBC, perhaps rather ventriloquistically, supported them (BBC 2005: 59). 
^30	  Reith’s comment provides a representative flavour of this sentiment: “In earliest years accused of setting out to give the public not what it wanted but what the BBC thought it should have, the answer was that few knew what they wanted, fewer what they needed” (Reith 1949: 101).
^31	  “Merit goods”, in the language of neo-classical economics, are goods which confer long term benefits but which no individual thinks worth paying for. Examples include high culture, scientific research, education etc. Because free markets tend to undersupply merit goods it's generally accepted that there is a legitimate role for the state in providing them - hence public funding for education, the arts, research and public service broadcasting. Without the justification afforded by its provision of merit goods the legitimacy of both public funding and a system of governance offering those who pay few opportunities either to “exit” or exercise their “voice” (see Hirschman 1970). 
^32	  Other than in a brief mention of Putnam’s “Bowling Alone” (Putnam 2000) characterising television as “the villain of the piece” (Pattie, Seyd and Whiteley 2004: 261).
^33	  Pattie, Seyd and Whitely (2004: 77) sensibly acknowledge the porous boundaries between the notions of consumer and citizen when observing that “in their day to day consumption behaviour they [ie people in the UK RC] are acting politically” and argue that the nature of political participation in the UK “makes it meaningful to talk about ‘consumer citizenship’” (Pattie, Seyd and Whitely 2004: 267).
^34	  Castells and Habermas score the same number of citations in the index. 
^35	  For exemplary cases in point see the coupling of broadcasting and health care (the classic loci of Marshallian social rights) by Leys 2001 and broadcasting and education by Garnham 1993.
^36	  We may pass over this occidental perspective as not unreasonable when addressing so western a phenomenon – the notable oriental instances of, inter alia, Indian, Japanese, Taiwanese and Thai public service broadcasting notwithstanding.
^37	  This separation enables Murdock to sidestep a potential conflict between cultural or “recognition” rights on one hand and civic and political rights on the other when he specifically considers information rights (see Murdock 1999). 
^38	  Pattie, Seyd and Whitely (2004: 10) observe that “Marshall’s ‘linear, cumulative model’ of the development of citizenship is problematic, but is nevertheless a starting point for debates about contemporary citizenship in Britain”. 
^39	  Ofcom, the Office of Communications, is the integrated regulator of electronic communications which replaced five former agencies and which was created under the 2003 Communications Act.
^40	  This “guardianship” mentality was exemplified in the Pilkington Report (1962), for discussion see, inter alia Collins, Garnham and Locksley 1988: 114-117.
^41	  The Neil report (BBC 2004b) responded to Lord Hutton’s criticisms of BBC journalism and proposed measures to improve it.
^42	  There is, of course, no necessary correspondence between the normative and the empirical. 
